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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
sarily proceed in the Supreme Court. The court, recognizing the
plaintiffs' dilemma, insisted, nevertheless, that relief against the
State itself could not be granted in the Supreme Court. Levine
v. Parsons,5 a case in which relief similar to that sought by the
plaintiff here was granted, was distinguished on the ground that
the question of jurisdiction was not raised.
It was pointed out in the opinion in the present case that,
while the plaintiffs may have no remedy in the courts, their peti-
tion will receive consideration on the administrative leveL In
this case the administrative ruling was adverse to the plaintiffs.
It would seem that a review of the defendants' determination
might be sought in the Supreme Court.6 In view of the broad
discretion given to the officials in the treatment of bids once
they have been accepted,' however, the possibility that the ad-
ministrative decision would be reversed seems highly unlikely.
Statute of Limitations
The New York statute of limitations for judgments pro-
vides: "A final judgment or decree for a sum of money . . .
is presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of
twenty years from the time, when the party recovering it was
first entitled to a mandate to enforce it.' "8 It has been held that
the words "judgment or decree" are exclusive and that the sec-
tion does not apply to an order directing the payment of costs.
In Hornblower & Weeks v. Sherwood,"0 the Court of Appeals
was called upon to decide if the twenty year limitation applied
to bar the recovery of a fine -for criminal contempt of the Legis-
lature imposed by an order in a civil special proceeding. The
case arose on an action in the nature of interpleader to decide
whether the assignee of the party held in contempt could validly
claim the balance due to that party on his account with the plain-
tiff. Having been served with a writ of attachment, the plaintiff
had accumulated the money in the account for more than twenty
years. No further attempt was made to collect the money in
spite of the plaintiff's notice to the sheriff of the accumulation.
When the assignee claimed the fund this action was brought by
the plaintiff to determine the right to the fund. The Court of
Appeals, affirming (4-3) the decision of the Appellate Division,
held that the money was still subject to the attachment and there
was no presumption of satisfaction.
5. 258 App. Div. 1003, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 722 (3d Dep't 1940).
6. Under C. P. A. Article 78.
7. PUBLIC BUILDINGS LAW § 8 (4).
8. C. P. A. §44.
9. Warren v. Garlipp, 217 App. Div. 55, 216 N. Y. Supp. 466 (4th Dep't 1926).
10. 307 N. Y. 204, 120 N. E. 2d 790 (1954).
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The majority stressed the fact that the words "judgment or
decree" had been retained through the various changes in the
codes of procedure in spite of the fact that the category of special
proceedings with its resultant final orders had been created. Un-
der these circumstances they felt that what the Legislature had
not seen fit to add should not be supplied by the courts. The
dissenters maintained that the inclusion of final orders in C.P.A.
§ 44 could fairly be implied in view of the fact that the Legisla-
ture had apparently intended to create a comprehensive system
of limitations.11
A fine for contempt is unquestionably different from the
ordinary civil judgment. It is not, for example, a debt which
will be released by a discharge in bankruptcy. 2 A fine awarded
to the state for contempt of the Legislature would seem more
closely akin to a fine in a criminal action. It appears that there
is no limitation on the recovery of such flues.13
Service on Corporations
When the Legislature has provided an exclusive method to
be used for service on a party, failure to follow the prescribed
method obviates the attempt to obtain jurisdiction over the
party.1 4 In Sease v. Central Greyhound Lines of New York,1"
the Court of Appeals applied this rule most stringently.
The plaintiff, in order to ascertain the name and address of
the operator of a bus which is alleged to have caused the plain-
tiff damage in a highway accident, inquired: (1) at the office of
the sheriff where the accident report was filed; (2) at the local
office of the defendant nearest the scene of the accident; (3) of
the New York Bureau of Motor Vehicles via a State Police tele-
type to the offices of the Bureau in Albany where the defendant's
application for a motor vehicle license was filed. The report
from all of these sources was that the operator of the bus was
Central Greyhound Lines of New York with offices at 2600 Hamil-
ton Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. Proceeding on the theory that the
defendant was a foreign corporation, and, therefore, a non-resi-
dent operator of a motor vehicle in this state, the plaintiff at-
tempted service under Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
The defendant was, in fact, a New York corporation with offices
11. See C. P. A. § 10.
12. In re Koronsky, 170 Fed. 719 (2d Cir. 1907).
13. See Smith v. United States, 143 F. 2d 228, 229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 323 U. S.
729 (1944).
14. Eisenhofer v. New York Zeiting Publishing & Printing Co., 91 App. Div.
94, 86 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dep't 1904).
15. 306 N. Y. 284, 117 N. E. 2d 899 (1954).
